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Abstract
The Bell-KS theorem and the more recent ψ-epistemic no-go theo-
rems of QM are discussed in the context of Entropic Dynamics. In doing
so we find that the Bell-KS theorem allows for, a perhaps overlooked,
hybrid-contextual model of QM in which one set of commuting observ-
ables (position in this case) is non-contextual and all other observables
are contextual. Entropic Dynamics is in a unique position as compared to
other foundational theories of QM because it derives QM using standard
techniques in Bayesian probability theory. In this formalism, position is
the preferred basis from which inferences about other contextual opera-
tors are made. This leads to the interpretation that Entropic Dynamics
is a hybrid-contextual model of QM, which we show to be consistent with
the Bell-KS theorem and QM.
1 Introduction
Quantum Mechanics (QM) is an odd mix of the predictable and unpredictable.
On one hand, it is hugely successful in its ability to predict the set of eigenvalues,
expectation values, and operators for a particle-system of interest. On the other
hand, each measurement holds some amount of unpredictability, quantified by a
probability distribution, except for a few trivial cases. This unpredictable nature
leaves a space for the many interpretations of QM to coexist inharmoniously
within the community - a community, no doubt, easily bothered by disharmony
of any-type.
The community reduces and organizes this disharmony by ruling out inter-
pretations and foundational theories of QM that disagree with the predictable
findings of QM. This is done by first making a few reasonable assumptions a
theory of QM may obey, and then by showing these assumptions lead to con-
tradictions in the formalism, construct a no-go theorem. This is the basis of
the Bell inequalities [1], the Bell-KS theorem [2, 3, 4], as well as the findings
of Pusey-Barret-Rudolph (PBR) [5] (reviewed in [6]) on the epistemic inter-
pretation of the wavefunction. Post-analysis, the final results are sometimes
tabulated in 2 by 2 tables – for example:
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ψ-ontic ψ-epistemic
contextual A B
noncontextual C D
,
and are followed by statements like, “theories of type “C” or “D” are ruled out
by the Bell-KS theorem and “B” is ruled out by PBR”. A reader may be inclined
to conclude that QM must be a theory of type “A” (potential interpretation of
Bohmian mechanics). The 2 by 2 is by nature an over simplification; it fails
to span the entire set of plausible theories, and consequently interpretations,
of QM. This is due the fact that no-go theorems are proofs by contradiction,
and only theories which strictly adhere to their (shown invalid) assumptions are
ruled out.
In particular, this paper will show Entropic Dynamics (ED) to be a theory of
QM which lies on the line between theories “B” and “D”, while not being ruled
out by any of the aforementioned discussed no-go theorems. We classify ED as a
hybrid-contextual theory of QM because positions are treated noncontextually
and all other observables are treated contextually – the main result of this paper.
In the same way, other theories and interpretations of QM may slip between the
cracks of these no-go theorems, which reopens the perhaps presumed closed
universe of discourse for a few edge theories and interpretations of QM.
ED will be reviewed briefly as it pertains to the no-go theorems of interest.
New insights of how these no-go theorems are handled within ED will be pre-
sented and some critiques will be given. The sense in which a theory can be
hybrid-contextual and still obey QM will be discussed.
2 Entropic Dynamics
Entropic Dynamics is an application of inference and probabilistic techniques
with the goal of extracting laws of physics. Here we are interested in the con-
straints and assumptions required to derive Quantum Mechanics from the first
principles of inference and probability updating [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Here we
briefly review the aspects of ED pertaining to the no-go theorems of interest.
An extended review can be found at [7].
The first step in any inferences problem is to state the universe of discourse,
the set of possible outcomes or microstates, one would like to infer on the ba-
sis of incomplete information. To derive Quantum Mechanics (in flat space)
the universe of discourse spanned by N particles are their positions in a flat
Euclidean space X (metric δab). Our knowledge of the positions of particles
is characterized by a probability density ρ(x) where x is a coordinate in a 3N
dimensional configuration space of particle coordinates xan, where a = 1, 2, 3
denotes the ath spacial axis of the nth particle’s position. When convenient we
may use a super-index notation xA ≡ xan where A = (n, a). From the onset, par-
ticles have definite yet unknown positions and are treated as the “physical” or
“ontological” quantities we are interested in inferring. QM will be derived using
this universe of discourse – namely that particle positions are noncontextual.
Now that the microstates have been specified, we are inclined to ask how the
position of these particles change. In particular, if the particles are located at x,
we wish to know how probable it is for x→ x′, that is, we seek a probability of
the form P (x′|x) to quantify this uncertainty. Not knowing anything about how
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particles change position gives trivial dynamics, so we make the following as-
sumptions: 1) particles move along continuous trajectories and 2) particles may
have a tendency to be correlated and drift. These assumptions are represented
by expectation value constraints on P (x′|x). The first assumption is saturated
by making large ∆xan = x
′a
n − x
a
n improbable. This is done by imposing P (x
′|x)
have small variances, κn, in particle coordinates,
〈∆xan∆x
b
n〉δab = κn, (n = 1, . . . , N) (1)
(where motion is continuous in the limit κn → 0). The second assumption is
imposed by one additional constraint,
〈∆xA〉∂Aφ =
∑
n,a
〈∆xan〉
∂φ(x)
∂xan
= κ′, (2)
where κ′ is another small constant and ∂φ(x)∂xan
is the “drift” gradient. There
are many probability distributions P (x′|x) which satisfy the above expectation
value constraints. We therefore use the method of maximum entropy [8, 9, 10]
to find the “least biased” distribution by maximizing the entropy,
S[P,Q] = −
∫
dx′P (x′|x) log
P (x′|x)
Q(x′|x)
, (3)
with respect to the expectation value constraints via the Lagrange multiplier
method. Let {αn} be the Lagrange multipliers which impose the N constraints
from (1) and let α′ be the Lagrange multiplier which imposes (2). Maximizing
the above entropy with respect to these constraints and normalization gives the
following probability distribution after completing the square,
P (x′|x) =
1
Z
exp
[
−
1
2
∑
n
αnδab(△x
a
n −△x
a
n)(△x
b
n −△x
b
n)
]
, (4)
where 〈∆xA〉 = α
′
αn
δab ∂φ
∂xbn
. The prior distribution Q(x′|x) is a very broad
normalizable Gaussian distribution encoding that before constraints are made,
particles may jump anywhere with near to equal probability, and so, it has
been absorbed into the normalization constant. There are explicit and in-depth
arguments for the notion of an instant in ED [7, 8] that we need not explore here;
however, in summary, t is introduced as a convenient bookkeeping parameter to
label changes in the probability distribution. In particular, △t fits neatly into
the transition probability,
P (x′|x,∆t) =
1
Z
exp[−
∑
n,a
(
mn
2η∆t
(∆xan − 〈∆x
a
n〉) (∆x
a
n − 〈∆x
a
n〉)] , (5)
as a measure of fluctuations, such that the state of knowledge of the positions of
particles at a later time t′ is given by marginalizing over the previous position
coordinates,
ρ(x′|t′) =
∫
P (x′|x,∆t)ρ(x|t) dx, (6)
where ρ(x|t) ≡ ρ(x). Equation (6) may be recast as a differential equation for
ρ(x|t) (an explication may be found in [8]),
∂tρ = −∂A
(
ρvA
)
, (7)
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which may be recognized as the Focker-Planck equation because the current
“velocity” vA of the probability flow in configuration space is,
vA = mAB∂BΦ where m
AA′ = m−1n δ
aa′δnn′ and Φ = ηφ− η log ρ
1/2 .
(8)
This form of probability updating, from maximum entropy considerations, leads
to a diffusion equation of the N particles. To derive QM, we need an additional
mechanism for updating the probability of the positions of the particles. We
impose Φ to be a dynamical variable that further updates ρ, and briefly, [7]
finds QM to take the form of a non-dissipative diffusion. This is done by letting
the evolution of ρ and Φ be dynamically coupled (Hamilton’s) equations,
∂tρ =
δH˜
δΦ
and ∂tΦ = −
δH˜
δρ
. (9)
The “ensemble Hamiltonian” H˜ is chosen so that the first equation above re-
produces (7) (which in principle may always be done) in which case the second
equation in (9) becomes a Hamilton-Jacobi equation. A more complete specifi-
cation of H˜ is,
H˜ [ρ,Φ] =
∫
dx
[
1
2
ρmAB∂AΦ∂BΦ+ ρV + ξm
AB 1
ρ
∂Aρ∂Bρ
]
, (10)
where the “kinetic” (dΦ)2 terms reproduces (7), and the potential terms, V (x)
and a “quantum” potential, are forcibly independent of Φ as they originate
from integration constants in the solution for H˜ satisfying (7). The form of the
potential terms is suggested by information geometry in the presence of this
inference framework [7]. Nothing prevents the combining of ρ and Φ into a
single complex function Ψ ∼ ρ1/2 exp(iΦ/h¯), and after some massaging which
will not be reviewed here, ED reproduces the linear Schro¨dinger equation,
ih¯
∂Ψ
∂t
= −
∑
n
h¯2
2mn
▽2n Ψ+ VΨ , (11)
as an application of inference. At this point the standard Hilbert space formal-
ism may be adopted to represent the epistemic state Ψ(x) as a vector,
|Ψ〉 =
∫
dxΨ(x)|x〉 with Ψ(x) = 〈x|Ψ〉 . (12)
The expression of |Ψ〉 in another basis is regarded as a potentially convenient
way of expressing position space wavefunctions.
A more general SE equation, which includes the presence of external nonzero
electromagnetic vector potentials ~A, may also be generated by ED [7]. This is
done by applying an additional expectation value constraints △xaAa(xn) =
κ′′n when maximizing (3), similar in form to the drift potential from equation
(2). Spin is generated by positing the existence of a “spin frame” field ~s(x)
(motivated through geometric algebra), which again constrains the expected
drift of the particles. The drift potential φ, electromagnetic vector potential,
and spin frame fields are introduced as epistemic parameters and update the
position space distributions of quantum mechanical particles - they are only as
4
ontic as the changes in probability distributions they generate, but probability
distributions are epistemic in general. The Pauli equation for a single particle
has been found using a spin frame in ED [13]. The correct spin statistics for
identical multi-particle states has yet to be generated from ED, so at this point
we impose a symmetrization postulate ex post facto, which of course is no better
or worse than the standard quantum mechanical formalism.
2.1 Measurement in ED
A natural question is, “If position is the only definite quantity, how are other
operators in Quantum Mechanics measured?”. This question was originally
addressed in [14] and more recently is addressed in [15] as well as how the notions
of von Neuman, weak measurements, and Weak Values [16, 17, 18] fit into ED.
This question is only addressed to the extent “operators” and “measurement”
are defined within the Entropic Dynamics framework. Measurement is a two
step process: the state of a system is first updated via a unitary and Schro¨dinger
evolution for the purpose of detection, which is a Bayesian update made due to
the presence of data. As ED is an application of inference and probability
updating, measurement is simply tackled by applying the appropriate rules of
inference. Because position is the only beable in ED, a state vector |Ψ〉 which is
expanded in the basis |a〉, is a potentially convenient stand-in for position space
wavefunctions,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
a
ca|a〉 =
∑
a
ca
∫
ψa(x)|x〉 dx =
∫
Ψ(x)|x〉 dx. (13)
An operator such as Aˆ is an epistemic object, which does not require an ontic
existence within the ED framework; however, their values may still be inferred.
Operators, Weak Values, and eigenvalues are therefore a subset of a type of
quantity we call the inferables of the theory [15]. As it is the position of particles
which formulate the ontic objects in ED, we make inferences about inferables
by detecting positions.
To accomplish this, [14] introduces the concept of a unitary measurement
device UˆA|ai, t〉 = |xi, t
′〉, which maps states |a〉 (the state we wish to infer)
at time t to a position on a screen xa at a later time t
′. This allows for the
inference of |a〉 (the eigenvectors of an operator Aˆ) by making detections of xa
at a later time. An example of such a unitary measurement device is a periodic
crystal lattice or prism which diffracts “momentum” states to position states.
We have,
|Ψ′, t′〉 = UA|Ψ, t〉 =
∑
a
|xa, t
′〉〈a, t|Ψ, t〉 =
∑
a
ca|xa, t
′〉, (14)
such that p(xa|t
′) = p(a|t) = |ca|
2, that is, the particle may be detected at xa
with probability p(xa|t
′) at a later time as if it were earlier in the state |a〉.
Inferences can then be made about the operator Aˆ =
∑
a λa|a〉〈a| where λa are
arbitrary scalars. The actual detection of the location of a particle in a single
experiment is facilitated with another detection device such as a photo-plate,
CCD camera, or bubble chamber. In such instances, the probability of x given
a detection D is given by,
P ′(x) = q(x|D) =
q(x,D)
q(D)
=
p(x)q(D|x)
q(D)
, (15)
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where q(D|x) is the likelihood function which accounts for the accuracy of the
measurement device. In the present case, after a detection at D,
P ′(xa|t
′) = q(xa|D, t
′) =
p(xa|t
′)q(D|xa, t
′)
q(D)
, (16)
effectively “collapses” the wavefunction, which is to say the final state of the
system is known with certainty for sharply peaked likelihood functions in ED
[15]. Similarly, if we want to infer the spin of a particle, we preform a von
Neumann or a weak measurement to entangle the position and spin of the
particle (via unitary evolution as one would with a Stern-Gerlach device) such
that by detecting position, we may infer the spin in a similar fashion.
2.2 Remark
Quantum Mechanics has been derived as a peculiar application of epistemic
probability updating when the ontic elements of interest are the positions of
particles. No further interpretation of Quantum Mechanics in ED is needed.
The wavefunction is found to be a useful epistemic quantity for calculating
probability distributions, which represent the state of knowledge of a system.
Other quantum mechanical objects, like operators and Hilbert spaces, play a
supporting role.
Concepts in ED are naturally communicated in the the language of proba-
bility. The language generated by the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics clashes somewhat with the language of probability; for instance, the
notion of an “observable” makes little sense when nontraditional Hermitian op-
erators are considered, i.e. does one ever really claim to “observe” pˆn, ρˆ, or
one of its eigenvalues? In truth these quantities are inferred through the mea-
surement process no differently than the average energy of a statistical system
is inferred by measuring the height of mercury on a thermometer. What was
observed in this scenario is the height of the mercury and what is inferred is
the temperature and the energy of the system. The word “observable” really
looses meaning when one considers “measuring” the Weak Value of an operator
AW =
〈Ψ′|Aˆ|Ψ〉
〈Ψ′|Ψ〉 , which in general is a complex numbers that may lie outside the
eigenvalue spectrum of the operator Aˆ [16, 17, 18]. In ED, Weak Values are
simply categorized as potentially interesting inferables of the theory as they are
inferred from pointer variable (positions in ED) detections [15]. The language
used in contextuality proofs does not naturally coincide with the language of
probability and inference, which is touched upon later.
3 ψ-epistemic?
In the previous section we claimed that ψ is an epistemic object which represents
our current knowledge of the system in question. This immediately runs into
conflict with the ψ-epistemic no-go theorem from [5]; however, there is no issue.
An excellent review of the ψ-epistemic/ontic dichotomy is presented in [6] and
ED would be categorized as a realist (or partial realist) ψ-epistemic model. The
first assumption in [5] is (paraphrased) 1) is that a ψ-epistemic state has physical
values upon which inferences may be made. ED agrees with this assumption
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whole heartedly, and the variables which are “physical” in ED are alone the
definite yet unknown positions of particles. The second assumption (verbatim)
2) is that “systems which are prepared independently (a) have independent
physical states (b)”.
The second assumption requires further investigation: first (a) - what does
it mean for a system to be prepared independently and second (b) - what does
it mean for a system to have independent physical states? The definition of
independence in (a) seems to be saturated by the definition of independence
in probability theory, namely that if two systems are prepared independently
then their joint probability distribution is factorisable into independent prob-
ability distributions, p(x1, x2) = p1(x1)p2(x2), and therefore there are no cor-
relations between x1 and x2 at that time (however evolution may later induce
correlations). The quantum mechanical analog is that these two states are non-
entangled product states. The definition of independent physical states in (b)
is rather unclear from the outset but later is defined quantitatively by,
D(µ0, µ1) =
1
2
∫
|µ0(λ)− µ1(λ)|dλ, (17)
or equivalently in our notation,
D[p1, p2] =
1
2
∫
|p1(x1)− p2(x2)|δ(x1 − x2)dx1dx2, (18)
such that if D = 1 then p1 and p2 are completely disjoint and thus occupy
(in their words) “independent physical states”. It is easy to see now how the
definition of independent in (a) differs from the definition of independent in
(b), in-fact the (a) and (b) definitions of independent clash in assumption 2)
for any independent joint probability p(x1, x2) = p1(x1)p2(x2) (a) which are
not entirely disjoint (i.e. “physically” independent (b)) – that is, if p1(x1) and
p2(x2) overlap in X . This regularly occurs in noninteracting multiparticle states
in Quantum and Statistical Mechanics ( can be obtained by marginalizing over
the momentum of a phase-space probability distribution ρ(x, p)). In ED, the
“physicality” of particle positions is independent of the state of knowledge at
hand. This is because probability is not a measure of physicality (or onticity)
but rather as a degree of belief or plausibility [8, 11, 12] that the proposition
“the particle is located at x” is true. As the leading assumptions of what entails
a ψ-epistemic state differ, the ψ-epistemic no-go theorem does not apply, which
is admitted as a possible exemption to their no-go theorem in the conclusion of
[5]. We are therefore justified in treating ψ epistemically.
4 Hidden Variables, Realism, and Non-locality
The subject of hidden variables, realism, and non-locality in ED has been
touched upon in [8, 14] and it will be further explored here. In Bell’s land-
mark paper [1], he found a contradiction between QM and hidden variable
theories which claimed local realism. It was accomplished by considering a hid-
den variable λ, which if known, would give the outcome of an experiment (an
eigenvalue of an operator) with certainty a0 = A(λ = λ0). By integrating over
the probability of a hidden variable,
〈A(λ)B(λ)〉 =
∫
p(λ)A(λ)B(λ) dλ, (19)
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he showed that such expectation values do not always agree with the expecta-
tions values of QM, for general p(λ).
In ED there is no such hidden variable. The particle dynamics are non-
deterministic as can be seen by the Brownian like paths particles take due to
the form of the transition probability P (x′|x) in (5), or after energy conserva-
tion, that the particles are undergoing a non-dissipative diffusion. Even if the
initial conditions of particle positions are known exactly (or with near perfect
precision), ρ(x) ∼ δ(x − x0), equation (6) is inevitably nondeterministic for
time steps ∆t. Because the Brownian paths of particles are non-differentiable,
other equi-temporal quantities (e.g. momentum or energy) are simultaneously
indefinite, which is another argument against position being a hidden variable.
The process which is deterministic in ED is the evolution of the probability
distribution as it follows the HJ-like equations from (9) given the appropriate
constraints, boundary, and initial conditions are known. The drift gradient
∂φ(x)
∂xan
∼ Φ updates the probability distribution of particle locations rather than
guiding each particle at every point, again seen by inspecting (9). The solution
is to realize that Φ(x) is an epistemic parameter that is coupled to ρ(x) for
each x in a complicated way through the HJ-like equations (9). The nonlocal
nature of probability as a means for quantifying knowledge (of the future, past,
or present) accounts for the nonlocal behavior of QM in ED. As any collapse
is an epistemic change in the system, each observer assigns distributions which
coincide with their current state of knowledge of the system.
5 Bell-KS type Theorems
The Bell-KS theorem sheds light on the incompatibility of hidden variable the-
ories and Quantum Mechanics [2, 3]. Years later Mermin demonstrated what
is considered to be the simplest expression of what is usually an algebra and
geometry intensive Bell-KS theorem [4]. Bell-KS proofs have been generalized
to the N -qubit Pauli group [19] and [20] gives a Bell-KS proof using continuous
position and momentum observables. In [19], they give a simple algorithm to
convert observable based KS proofs to a large number of projector based KS
proofs, so we will focus on the simpler observable based proofs.
The class of hidden variable theories the Bell-KS theorem excludes have
the following reasonable conditions: The value of an operator is definite yet
unknown such that we may assign it a preexisting value (its eigenvalue) called
its valuation [4, 19, 21]. The valuation of an operator Aˆ at any time is then,
v(Aˆ) = 〈a|Aˆ|a〉 = a. (20)
It is also assumed that functional relationships between operators f(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, ...) =
0 hold throughout the valuation process,
v(f(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, ...)) = f(v(Aˆ), v(Bˆ), v(Cˆ), ...) = 0. (21)
It should be noted that the considered operators must commute v(AˆBˆ) =
v(Aˆ)v(Bˆ) = v(BˆAˆ) when taking valuations for (21) to hold. Mermin demon-
strates the contradiction of equations (20) and (21) with Quantum Mechanics
by considering what is now know as the Peres-Mermin Square:
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ZI IX ZX
IZ XI XZ
ZZ XX YY
.
Each table entry is an observable from the 2-qubit Pauli group consisting of
a joint eigenbasis consisting of 4 eigenvectors. As a notational convenience we
will omit tensor products when there is no room for confusion and let X = σx
such that an arbitrary table entry XZIY represents σ
(1)
x ⊗ σ
(2)
z ⊗ I(3) ⊗ σ
(4)
y ,
following the notational structure in [19]. The product of the operators along a
given row or column is the rank 4 identity I(4) = II (in this notation) with the
exception of the last row, which is −II. Consider the valuation of the standard
matrix product of the elements of the first row,
v(ZI · IX · ZX) = v(II) = 1. (22)
Supposing (21) is true then
v(ZI · IX · ZX) = v(ZI)v(IX)v(ZX) = 1. (23)
The valuation of the ijth element Aij in the table is v(Aij) = ±1, and therefore
(21) imposes a constraint on the individual valuations v(ZI)v(IX)v(ZX) = 1,
which is only satisfied if either 0 or 2 of the valuations are −1. This cuts the
universe of discourse from 23 = 8 possibilities down to 4. Let Ai⊙ be the
product of the operators in the ith row and A⊙j the product of the operators
in the jth column such that above A1⊙ =ZI · IX ·ZX is the standard matrix
product between the listed operators. Mermin showed his square indeed leads to
a contradiction when considering the product of the row and column valuations,
∏
i
v(Ai⊙)v(A⊙i) = v(II)5v(−II) = −1, (24)
whereas applying (21) to each row and column, v(Ai⊙) =
∏
j v(A
ij), gives,
∏
i
v(Ai⊙)v(A⊙i)→
∏
i
∏
j
v(Aij)2 = 1, (25)
which is a contradiction. This is due to the fact that not all of the elements
in Mermin’s square commute and therefore all observables cannot be assigned
definite eigenvalues. Quantum mechanical formalism and experiment agrees
with (24) and not with (25) and thus (21) must be thrown out. Bell makes
a point that it may be overconstraining for the valuation to produce identical
values when different sets of commuting observables are being considered, just
to refute it by noting that a space-like separated observer could change which
set of commuting observables he/she wishes to measure mid-flight. A hidden
variable theory would then have to explain this nonlocal change in the valuation
meaning that the Bell-KS theory only refutes local hidden variables theories.
5.1 Interpreting the Contradiction: Contextuality
The standard interpretation of the contradiction by Bell, Kochen, Specker, Mer-
min and others is that quantum mechanical observables are contextual, meaning
that the operator’s “aspect”, “character”, or “value” depend on the remaining
9
set of commuting observables under which it is considered. Any observable
which does not depend on the remaining set of commuting observables in this
way is called noncontextual, which, for example, are the individual observables
v(Aij) from the Mermin square and (25).
In more recent years the interpretation of the Bell-KS theorem, which in
principle would rule out all local hidden variable theories obeying (20) and (21),
has been under scrutiny, in essence, for having a more restrictive interpreta-
tion than the theorem merits. The work by [22, 23, 24] opens a loophole due
to the impracticality of infinite measurement precision, and thus the Bell-KS
theorem is “nullified” in their language. Appleby (and others) find the “nul-
lified” critique to be too harsh of a criticism [25]. De Ronde [26] points out
that epistemic and ontic contextualty are consistently being scrambled into a
omelet when perhaps the yoke and egg whites should be cooked separately. He
defines ontic contextuality as the formal algebraic inconsistency of the operator
and valuation formalism of Quantum Mechanics within the Bell-KS theorem –
having nothing to do with measurement. The epistemic counterpart is more
aligned with the principles of Bohr in that Quantum Mechanics involves an
interaction between system and measurement apparatus whose outcomes are
inevitably communicated in classical terms – the context is given by the mea-
surement device. The difference is subtle but, as noted, ontic contextuality is
defined to be independent of the differing interpretations of quantum mechanics
where epistemic contextuality need not be. Our treatment of contextuality does
separate in this fashion; however, de Ronde’s usage of the word “ontic” refers to
the quantum formalism, whereas our usage only refers to ontic particle positions
in ED.
5.2 Critiques
As we know, the assumptions (20) and (21) lead to contradictions. Inevitably
(20) and (21) will be illogical on several levels, some of which are discussed be-
low. The main critique we present is, how do we know that the valuation of an
observable v(Aˆ) accurately represents the notion of definite, preexisting values
of an operator, that would be obtained if a measurement is carried out? The
alleged strength of the Bell-KS theorem is that analysis has been done indepen-
dent of the particular state |Ψ〉 and thus it should hold for all |Ψ〉 in general.
This is troubling for a number of reasons, the first being that a particular |Ψ〉
may not have components along every eigenvector of an operator Aˆ, in which
case a zero probability event could be assigned a definite existence, and one
would never know because |Ψ〉, which all of the observables in question pertain
to, has not been specified. This issue here is an interplay between the ontic and
epistemic contextuality given by de Ronde, because only sensible valuations may
be given if the state of the system is known – in general the density matrix ρˆ.
If the valuation process is to be applicable to arbitrary “observables” inde-
pendent of the state at hand, then one runs into another logical inconsistency
when attempting to apply valuations to a density matrix, ρˆ, because it repre-
sents the probabalistic state of a system. It makes little sense to have different
sets of commuting observables {ρˆ1, ρˆ2, ρˆ3...} which are required to span to the
same Hilbert space as the state in question |Ψ〉 (or ρˆ). Furthermore, the valua-
tion of a density matrix ρˆ =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| gives one of its eigenvalues, pi, which are
probabilities themselves and are never directly observed, but are usually inferred
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from the frequency of a large number of independent trials. One cannot possi-
bly claim that a system is ontically expressing a definite preexisting probability
value pi. Probability by its nature is a measure of the indeterminance of a state
|i〉 rather than a value (physically) carried by the state |i〉 – which is as epis-
temic as it gets! If Alice knowingly prepares one system and Bob does not know
which system Alice has prepared, then it is clear that pi’s cannot have a defi-
nite existence because both Alice and Bob disagree about said values over the
same single “ontic” system of interest. Furthermore, when the a measurement
is made to determine the state, the probability value updates (the eigenvalue
changes) and in this sense the assignment of an eigenvalue ρˆ through valuation
represents nothing physical about the state of the system’s definite, preexisting
values that would in principle be obtained if a measurement was carried out.
In this sense, the eigenvalues of operators in general do not represent definite,
preexisting (noncontextual) values of an operator.
There are some inferences that can be made using probability theory (and
thus ED) that formally cannot be made using the standard tools of quantum
mechanics. For instance, one of the motivating arguments for the use of valua-
tion functions in [3] is that the value of an operator Aˆ and its square Bˆ = Aˆ2
clearly have highly correlated outcomes that should be represented though a
joint probability distribution P (a, b) (implied for a single experiment), which is
incorrectly given as P (a, b) = p(a)p(b). If a measurement of Aˆ is preformed such
that the probability of a particular outcome is p(a) = |〈a|Ψ〉|2, but the eigen-
values of Bˆ are related to the eigenvalues of Aˆ by a known condition b = f(a),
the desired joint probability distribution which relates the outcome of a to the
outcome of b is,
P (a, b) = p(a)p(b|a) = p(a)δ(b− f(a)), (26)
where δ(b − f(a)) is the Dirac/Kronecker delta function if Aˆ has a continu-
ous/discrete spectrum, which is obtained through standard probability theory.
The probability of finding a value b without any knowledge of the particular a
is obtained by marginalizing over a,
p(b) =
∑
a
P (a, b) =
∑
a
p(a)δ(b − f(a)). (27)
The pedagogical case where every eigenvalue a has a negative counterpart (ex-
cept the possible a = 0) and Bˆ = Aˆ2, such that f(a) = a2 leads to
p(b = a2) =
∑
a
p(a)δ(b− a2) = p(a) + p(−a), (28)
the probability of b takes the value a2 is the sum of the probabilities of a and
−a. Trying to make this inference from QM would require defining states like
|Ψ〉 ∼
∑
ab caδb,a2 |a〉 ⊗ |b〉 =
∑
a ca|a〉 ⊗ |a
2〉 and using Born’s Rule; however,
vectors of that form are redundant for a single particle as both Aˆ and Bˆ both
share the eigenbasis {|a〉} which spans a single Hilbert space |a〉 ⊗ |a2〉 → |a〉
rather than a tensor product of two, and for that reason, vectors of this type
are thrown out.
Due to these critiques, and that in ED one may infer eigenvalues from po-
sition detections, it is difficult to know what precisely a valuation procedure
11
represents meta-physically (linguistically), besides the simple choice of a matrix
element. As discussed, the valuation of an operator may not always represent
an ontic value of an observable, and therefore we suggest relaxing this notion
and replacing it by the more general statement, “The valuation of an operator
(or set of operators) represents a quantity that in principle may be inferred”,
or in the language of [15], “The valuation of an observable is an inferable of the
theory”.
5.3 Hybrid-contextual theories
It should be noted that in Entropic Dynamics, the idea of valuation is very
unnatural. An inference based theory allows us to state, quantify, and represent
how much we do not know about the state of a system through a probability
distribution, upon which we use the rules of inference and probability updat-
ing to determine what we do. Noted earlier in Section 2.1, the measurement
procedure in ED allows for the inference of Aˆ =
∑
a λa|a〉〈a| where λa are ar-
bitrary scalars, by making detections of position at a later time. Eigenvalues
themselves are an afterthought of the inference process that are epistemically
inferable parameters by the changes they make to a probability distribution.
Strictly speaking, the Bell-KS theorem discards realist theories in which all
of the considered operators are treated ontically through their valuation. This
leaves open the possibility for a hybrid-contextual theory in which only a subset
of commuting observables are definite yet unknown, or noncontextual, while
other variables (or sets of commuting observables) are contextual. To date the
only theory of Quantum Mechanics known to the author that seems to fit this
description precisely is Entropic Dynamics [7].
The only operators required to undergo valuation in ED are the 3N -particle
position coordinates with their corresponding 3N operators Xˆ(n). In the lan-
guage of valuations, we would have,
vx(xˆ
(n)
i ) ≡ 〈x
(n)
i |xˆ
(n)
i |x
(n)
i 〉 = x
(n)
i , (29)
for a particular coordinate x
(n)
i . Position operators trivially obey (21),
vx(f(xˆ
(n)
i , xˆ
(m)
j , ...)) = f(v(xˆ
(n)
i ), v(xˆ
(m)
j ), ...) = 0, (30)
for any function f , because all position operators mutually commute. No parity
contradiction in the sense of [4, 19] can be reached because all of the operators
requiring valuation mutually commute. The Bell-KS proofs are proofs by con-
tradiction. This means a set of counter examples has been found which rule out
the general applicability of assigning definite yet unknown values to all opera-
tors all the time; however, as seen above, there are instances in which there is no
contraction and the assignment of definite yet unknown values in this instance
is consequently not ruled out.
Operators other than position, Aij , need not be noncontextual in ED as
they are considered to be epistemic in nature. In this case, one should not
claim Aij , one of its eigenvalue aij , or a state |aij〉 =
∫
dxψaij (x)|x〉, to have
a definite existence outside of characterizing our knowledge of the definite yet
unknown positions of particles x. That being said, when one can expand Aij in
the position basis, we find that the Aij are naturally contextual – although in
principle this is unwarranted in ED as no valuation is required.
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As it is the position that is definite, the valuation of the operator Aij , before
measurement (where |x〉 = |x1〉 ⊗ |x2〉... ⊗ |xN 〉 for N particles), is one of the
diagonal matrix elements in the x basis,
vx(A
ij)→ 〈x0|A
ij |x0〉 = 〈x0|
∑
n
|aijn 〉a
ij
n 〈a
ij
n |x0〉 =
∑
n
aijn |〈x0|a
ij
n 〉|
2 6= aijn , (31)
where in this case it is supposed that the definite yet unknown value of x is x0.
This is obviously not one of the eigenvalues or “observables” of Aij , but in ED
Aij is an inferable and so is vx(A
ij). The position space valuation vx(A
ij) is
some real number which in principle may be assigned to any position coordinate.
In general, parity type proofs of the Bell-KS theorem require Aij to be simul-
taneously part of an even number of sets of commuting observables [19]. This
means an operator Aij is simultaneously diagonalized in (at-least two) different
basis,
Aij =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉a
ij
n 〈a
i⊙
n | =
∑
n
|a⊙jn 〉a
ij
n 〈a
⊙j
n |, (32)
where, for example in the Peres-Mermin square, |ai⊙n 〉 refers to the eigenvec-
tors of the commuting set of variables from the ith row and |a⊙jn 〉 refers to the
eigenvectors of the commuting set of variables from the jth column. The largest
number of distinct sets of eigenvectors is equal to the number of sets of com-
muting observables in the Bell-KS proof. Using this notation we may denote
the product of the operators in a commuting set by,
Ai⊙ =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉a
i1
n a
i2
n ...a
iN
n 〈a
i⊙
n | =
∑
n
|ai⊙n 〉a
i⊙
n 〈a
i⊙
n |, (33)
where N is the number of operators in the commuting set of observables. In
general, the application of (21) to the position valuations of {Aij} will not hold,
vx(A
i⊙)→
∏
j
vx(A
ij), (34)
because it would require,
∑
n
|〈x0|a
i⊙
n 〉|
2ai⊙n →
∏
j
(∑
n
aijn |〈x0|a
i⊙
n 〉|
2
)
j
, (35)
which is potentially equal, but in the vast majority of cases is not. The lack of
equality can be seen if one considers three commuting momentum observables
pˆ1⊗ 1ˆ2, 1ˆ1⊗ pˆ2, and pˆ1⊗ pˆ2 with {|a
i⊙
n 〉} = {|p1, p2〉} – the LHS diverges while
the RHS is zero because it involves products of odd integrals. This poses no
issue in ED because Ai⊙ or the individual Aij need only exist epistemically,
so their valuations (matrix elements) need not agree - the product of matrix
elements need not be the matrix element of the product so imposing equality is
nonsensical. Furthermore (if above was not enough), contextuality is preserved
among non-position observables (for noncontextual position) as can be seen
when (21) is applied to the product of all of the commuting sets of observables,
∏
i
vx(A
i⊙)v(A⊙i)→
∏
i
∏
j
vx(A
ij)2 ≥ 0, (36)
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for situations when the LHS is less than zero or it is simply not equal to the RHS.
This calculation shows that definite (noncontextual) positions before measure-
ment do not imply definite (noncontextual) Aij , and therefore, we are justified
in treating the operators Aij contextually - which means we should not apply
valuations to them, or if we do, we should not expect (21) to hold. Spin in
ED is not required to be noncontextual so we don’t need to apply valuations to
them either. The current form of ED would potentially be ruled out if Aij were
noncontextual under position valuations in general - but this is not the case as
the matrix elements are simply epistemic inferables.
Because all position operators always mutually commute with one another
and therefore are all simultaneously diagonalizable in the same set of position
eigenvectors (i.e. |x〉 = |xi⊙〉 = |x⊙j〉 = |x⊙⊙〉), they may be treated noncon-
textually together. If an operator is a product of contextual and noncontextual
operators, it remains contextual because applying position space valuations on
the noncontextual operators leaves the contextual operators contextual. This
can be seen by applying position space valuations to the continuous operators
defined in [20] (|〈SQM 〉| = 6). As noted in the critiques, the valuation of an
operator may not always express the definite yet unknown values of an observ-
able – it may be best to relax this notion such that the valuation of an operator
represents a quantity that in principle may be inferred, an inferable, in general.
A question of interest is, how, if everything is to be measured or inferred
using a (non-contextual) position basis (Section 2.1 and [14, 15]), is the contex-
tual nature of a set of contextual operators Aˆij ∈ A non-contradictory? This
question is especially tricky because it mixes the epistemic and ontic palates of
contextuality in the sense of [26], who, as well as [27], quote Mermin , “the whole
point of an experimental test of KS [theorem] misses the point.”. That being
said, the contexuality of the operators Aij is simply expressed through the lack
of commutativity between sets of commuting observables, we do not need to
do position valuations {Aij} to make inferences about the states. ED perhaps
sheds some light onto Mermin’s statement about the lack of an experimental
test.
Suppose Alice prepares a two particle system and sends it to Bob who has a
compound unitary measurement device (14) for each set of commuting observ-
ables (each row and column) of the Mermin square (for simplicity), but really
this is applicable to any construction of sets of commuting observables. Because
Bob can only measure one row or column for a given pair of particles sent from
Alice, him choosing a measurement device from the ith row or column means he
has chosen and applied the unitary measurement device UˆAi⊙ to the incoming
state and mapped it to position coordinates from which inferences can be made.
That is, the physical application of UˆAi⊙ picks, P
i, the ith row,
P i ∗
A11 A12 A13
A21 A22 A23
A31 A32 A33
−→ UˆAi⊙ A
i1 Ai2 Ai3 −→ xi1 xi2 xi3 ,
and at a later time one may apply valuation(s) to the associated positions op-
erators if one wishes, because the operator is position based (at that later time)
Aij →
∑
n |x
ij
n 〉a
ij
n 〈x
ij
n |. The positions may be detected and the associated
commuting set of Aij may be inferred.
This process resembles the epistemic notion of contextuality presented in
[26]. The operators Aij are treated contextually – the position space valuation
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may be applied after the set of commuting observables has been chosen by the
unitary measurement device. As only one column or row may be picked at a
time by Bob, who seeks to measure a set of commuting observables, the quantum
mechanical expectation values match that as read by Bob (and are therefore in
the form of (24)). Alice, being in the dark, does not know which row Bob will
pick and is free to assign a probability Bob picks the ith row or column, and after
learning the chosen row or column may she update her probability accordingly.
6 Discussion
The most natural inferential tool in ED is probability. The critiques given in
Section 5.2 are further motivation for the use of probability to make rational
inferences, while the interpretation of the valuation functions, which inevitably
lead to contradictions in the Bell-KS theorem, are suspicious by several ac-
counts. There, reason was given for the need of a more general interpretation of
the valuation of an operator, which was stated, “The valuation of an operator
(or set of operators) represents a quantity that in principle may be inferred”.
Because the probability of a state is only defined in terms of its set of commuting
observables, and because there is no way to generate a unique joint probability
distributions among non-commuting observables [28], a rational discussion on
the potential simultaneous onticity between non-commuting observables is not
possible – luckily ED formulates QM by assuming the position of particles to
be the only ontic variables.
ED is in a unique position among foundational theories of QM because QM
was derived by applying standard probability techniques to a system having
ontic positions of particles. This naturally classifies the ontic and epistemic
elements of QM and provides a clean cut interpretation of QM such that physical
and conceptual problems in QM may be handled rigorously (as it has in [14, 15]
and other recent articles). The hope is that a full treatment of spin in ED will
provide better notions of the symmetrization postulate and the Pauli exclusion
principle, but this problem has yet to be tackled in full. At this point more work
can be done to make sure that ED is able to reproduce all of the known results of
QM and to hopefully shine some light on the many interpretational paradoxes,
no-go theorems, and problems that surround QM. The end goal of ED is to
show inferential origins of physical laws. This generates new interpretations
and directions for old ideas and hopefully ED will generate some new physics
as well.
This paper shows the sense in which a foundational QM theory may be
hybrid-contextual, i.e. one set of commuting operators is noncontextual (ontic)
while all others are contextual, and still obey the Bell-KS theorem. In ED this
occurs because contextual operators are not required to have definite ontolog-
ical existence outside of their characterization of the state of knowledge of the
noncontextual operators. A loose guide for a theory to be hybrid-contextual,
and also agree with QM, is that its ontic variables are treated noncontextually
while its epistemic variables are treated contextually. The values of interest as-
sociated with contextual operators (energy, momentum, and spin) are inferred
by measurement of noncontextual observables (position in ED).
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